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1Secrecy Analysis for Cooperative NOMA Networks
With Multi-Antenna Full-Duplex Relay
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Lisheng Fan, Minglu Jin, Member, IEEE and Mohamed-Slim Alouini, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In a downlink non-orthogonal multiple access (NO-
MA) system, the reliable transmission of cell-edge users cannot
be guaranteed due to severe channel fading. On the other
hand, the presence of eavesdroppers can severely threaten the
secure transmission due to the open nature of wireless channel.
Thus, a two-user NOMA system assisted by a multi-antenna
decode-and-forward relay is considered in this paper, and a
two-stage jamming scheme, full-duplex-jamming (FDJam), is
proposed to ensure the secure transmission of NOMA users. In
the FDJam scheme, using full-duplex, the relay transmits the
jamming signal to the eavesdropper while receiving confidential
messages in the first stage, and the base station generates the
jamming signal in the second stage. Furthermore, we eliminate
the self-interference and the jamming signal at the relay and
the legitimate node, respectively, through relay beamforming.
To measure the secrecy performance, analytical expressions for
secrecy outage probability (SOP) are derived for both the cell-
center and cell-edge users, and the asymptotic SOP analysis
at high transmit power is presented as well. Moreover, two
benchmark schemes, half-duplex-jamming and full-duplex-no-
jamming, are also considered. Simulation results are presented
to show the accuracy of the analytical expressions and the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Beamforming design, full-duplex relay, non-
orthogonal multiple access, physical layer security, secrecy outage
probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to the excellent performance of spectrum utilization,
non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been proposed
for the 3GPP long term evolution advanced standard [1], and
is expected to be used for the fifth-generation (5G) mobile
networks, providing massive connectivity and low latency
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[2], [3]. Unlike the conventional orthogonal multiple access,
NOMA introduces a novel power domain based on the time or
frequency domains [4], [5]. Specifically, the users in NOMA
networks are allocated with different power according to their
channel conditions or transmission requirements, and then
their signals are superposed and transmitted over the same
channel [6]. At each receiver, successive interference cancella-
tion (SIC) is utilized to mitigate the cochannel interference and
extract the desired message from the received superposition
signal [7], [8].
Recently, to improve the transmission reliability, cooperative
NOMA schemes with relay have been widely studied [9],
[10], especially for users with long distance or poor channel
condition [11]–[17]. In [11], Zhang et al. utilized the near user
served as the cooperative full-duplex (FD) relay to forward
message for the far user in a downlink NOMA system, and the
outage probability and ergodic sum rate were derived. In [12],
Ding et al. proposed a two-stage relay selection strategy for the
cooperative NOMA system to achieve better performance than
the conventional max-min method. To assist the transmission
of the far user, Zhong et al. introduced a dedicated FD relay in
the NOMA system with two users, and both the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) and ergodic sum capacity were analyzed
[13]. In [14], performance gains were analyzed by Yue et
al. for a cooperative NOMA network relayed by the FD/HD
user with and without considering direct link between the BS
and the far user, respectively. Besides, a two-stage superposed
transmission scheme was proposed for the NOMA system with
a decode-and-forward (DF) relay by Duan et al., to further
enhance the transmission rate [15]. A novel NOMA scheme
with multiple relays and distributed space-time coding was
proposed by Zhao et al. in [16]. In [17], Chen et al. leveraged
the secondary NOMA relay to assist the primary transmission
of long distance in two slots, with power allocation derived.
Although cooperative NOMA schemes can enhance the
transmission reliability, the secure transmission is still a key
challenge due to the openness of wireless channel. Specifically,
eavesdroppers may exist in a NOMA system to intercept the
confidential messages of legitimate users, and thus threaten
their secure transmission [18]. Traditionally, to combat with
eavesdropping, encryption in upper layer is usually adopt-
ed, which may become vulnerable with the improvement of
computational power and capability [19]. Thus, an alternative
mechanism, physical layer security (PLS), was investigated by
Wyner [20]. Following this profound work, plenty of research
has been conducted to guarantee the security through physical-
layer techniques relying on the features of wireless channel,
2such as secure beamforming design [21], [22], artificial noise
[23], interference alignment [24], [25], and especially, relaying
[26]–[28]. Wang et al. proposed a joint cooperative scheme of
beamforming and jamming in [26], to improve the security of
an amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying network. In [27], Fan et
al. analyzed the influence of the cochannel interference on the
performance of secure transmission in the network with AF
relays. In [28], Chen et al. proposed a FD jamming scheme
to improve the secrecy capability of the relay network, and its
SOP was derived as well.
For NOMA, only a few works have studied its security
problem from the perspective of PLS [29]–[34]. In [29],
Ding et al. studied the security performance of unicasting
message in the NOMA system with the hybrid multicast-
unicast scheme. Novel transmit antenna selection schemes
were designed in [30] by Lei et al. to safeguard the secure
transmission in the single-input single-output (SISO) and
multi-input single-output (MISO) NOMA systems. In [31],
the decoding order, transmission rate and power allocation
were jointly optimized by He et al. in a NOMA system
with secrecy outage constraint considered. Secrecy outage
performance of large-scale NOMA networks was investigated
by Liu et al. in both the single-antenna and multi-antenna
scenarios [32]. In [33], Lv et al. proposed a novel secrecy
beamforming scheme assisted by artificial noise (AN) to
enhance the security of MISO NOMA systems when a multi-
antenna eavesdropper exists. Beamforming and jamming are
jointed optimized in [34] by Zhao et al. to guarantee the secure
transmission for MISO NOMA. Furthermore, relaying has also
been adopted in cooperative NOMA networks to guarantee the
secure transmission [35]–[37]. Chen et al. analyzed the secrecy
performance of cooperative NOMA systems for both AF and
DF half-duplex (HD) relays [35]. In [36], a two-way FD relay
was utilized to prevent both single and multiple eavesdroppers
overhearing the confidential information, with the help of AN.
Sun et al. considered the resource allocation problem in [37]
for FD MISO multicarrier NOMA systems, where a FD base
station (BS) was introduced to improve the security for both
multiple downlink and uplink users via AN.
For a downlink NOMA network, the BS can serve both the
cell-center and cell-edge users simultaneously. However, the
transmission between the BS and the cell-edge user may be
interrupted due to severe fading. Moreover, the message of
cell-edge user is much easier to be intercepted by potential
eavesdroppers than that of the cell-center user, due to the
fact that more transmit power should be allocated to the users
with poor channel conditions according to NOMA. Thus, in
this paper, we consider a two-user NOMA system with a
multi-antenna FD relay [38], providing reliable and secure
transmission for NOMA users. The main contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows.
 In downlink NOMA systems, the reliable and secure
transmission is almost impossible to achieve for the cell-
edge user with a weak channel. To solve this issue, we
introduce a multi-antenna FD relay in a NOMA system
with two users, and a two-stage jamming scheme, full-
duplex-jamming (FDJam), is proposed to guarantee the
secure transmission.
Fig. 1. Demonstration of the cooperative NOMA system assisted by multi-
antenna FD relay for secure transmission.
 For the FDJam scheme, the transmission can be divided
into two stages. In the first stage, the BS and FD relay
transmit the confidential message and jamming signal to
the cell-center user, relay and eavesdropper, respectively.
The jamming signal is transmitted by the BS when the
relay forwards the message to the cell-edge user in the
second stage.
 To further improve the performance, beamforming is
performed at the multi-antenna relay to cancel its self-
interference and the jamming signal at the legitimate user.
Accordingly, the analytical expressions of SOP are de-
rived for both cell-center and cell-edge user, respectively.
We also give the asymptotic SOP analysis to gain more
insights when the transmit power is high.
 Two benchmark schemes, i.e., half-duplex-jamming (HD-
Jam) and full-duplex-no-jamming (FDNoJam), are de-
signed and analyzed to verify the effectiveness of the
proposed FDJam scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the cooperative NOMA scheme with multi-antenna FD relay
is proposed. In Section III, the theoretical expressions of SOP
for NOMA users are derived, and the asymptotic SOP is also
analyzed. Two benchmark schemes are designed in Section
IV. In Section V, simulation results are presented, followed by
conclusions in Section VI.
Notation: IN is the N  N identity matrix. 0MN is
an M  N zero matrix. Ay, (A) 1 and kAk are the Her-
mitian transpose, inverse and Frobenius norm of matrix A,
respectively. kak denotes the Euclidean norm of vector a.
CMN represents the space of complex MN matrices. The
complex Gaussian distribution with mean a and covariance
matrix A can be expressed as CN (a;A). FX and fX denote the
cumulative density function and probability density function
of random variable X .
II. COOPERATIVE NOMA SCHEME WITH
MULTI-ANTENNA FD RELAY
In this section, the system model of the proposed coopera-
tive NOMA scheme with multi-antenna FD relay, FDJam, is
presented, followed by the relay beamforming design.
Consider a downlink cooperative NOMA network, including
one BS, two users, one malicious eavesdropper and one
trustable relay, as shown in Fig. 1. The relay is equipped with
3multiple antennas, and all the other nodes are equipped with a
single antenna. Assume that U1 is near the BS while U2 is far
away from the BS. Thus, there is no direct link between the
BS and U2 due to the severe path loss and shadowing. The
requirement and location information of U2 can be obtained
at the BS via the backhaul connected with the macro BS. A
multi-antenna DF relay, which can serve as a FD transmission
mode, is deployed to enhance the transmission reliability of U2
and combat the eavesdropping simultaneously. Furthermore, to
mitigate the self-interference at the FD relay, Nt antennas are
adopted for transmission and the other Nr antennas are used
for receiving. In the scheme, two stages are involved in each
time slot as in Fig. 1, which will be presented as follows.
A. First-Stage Transmission
In the first stage, the superimposed signal at the BS is
transmitted towards U1, the relay, and the eavesdropper, re-
spectively, i.e., BS ! fU1; R;Eg. Meanwhile, the FD relay
transmits the precoded jamming signal to the eavesdropper, U1
and itself, respectively, i.e., R! fU1; R;Eg, while U2 keeps
silent. Note that the link R! R is denoted as self-interference
caused by the FD operation.
According to the principle of NOMA, the transmitted signal
of the BS can be expressed as
s =
p
1Pss1 +
p
2Pss2; (1)
where Ps is the transmit power of the BS, 1 and 2 are
the power allocation coefficients for the messages s1 and s2,
respectively, which satisfy 1 + 2 = 1 and 2 > 1. Thus,
the received signal at U1 can be denoted as
y1;u1 = hsu1s+
p
Pjrhru1vjsjr + nu1 ; (2)
where nu1  CN (0; 21) is the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at U1, and Pjr denotes the jamming power
transmitted by the FD relay. vj 2 CNt1 is the precoding
vector of the relay satisfying kvjk2 = 1. The channel gain
from the BS to U1 is expressed as hsu1 =
p
0d
 2
su1 g1, where
0 denotes the channel gain at reference distance d = 1, dsu1
is the distance between the BS and U1,  is the path-loss
exponent, and g1 subjects to the Rayleigh fading. Similarly,
hru1 =
p
0d
 2
ru1 gru1 2 C1Nt represents the channel gains
from the relay to U1, in which dru1 is the distance between
the relay and U1, and gru1 denotes a 1Nt vector whose
elements are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
and follow CN (0; 1). In addition, sjr is the jamming symbol
transmitted by the relay with jsjrj2 = 1.
Then, the received signal at the FD relay can be denoted as
y1;r = uyrhsrs+
p
PjruyrHrrvjsjr + u
y
rnr; (3)
where ur 2 CNr1 is the decoding vector at the relay for
receiving and satisfies kurk2 = 1. The Nr  1 vector hsr
denotes the channel gains between the BS and relay, i.e., hsr =p
0d
 2
sr gsr. nr 2 CNr1 is the AWGN vector at the relay,
following CN (0; 2rINr ). Hrr 2 CNrNt represents the fading
self-interference channel at the FD relay, and we assume that
the perfect channel state information (CSI) on Hrr can be
available at the relay1 [39], [40]. The signal intercepted by
the eavesdropper can be denoted as
y1;e = hses+
p
Pjrhrevjsjr + ne; (4)
where ne  CN (0; 2e) is the AWGN at the eavesdrop-
per. hse denotes the channel gain with path loss from the
BS to eavesdropper, i.e., hse =
p
0d
 2
se gse. In addition,
hre =
p
0d
 2
re gre is the channel coefficient vector with Nt
dimensions from the FD relay to eavesdropper.
In this stage, we intend to degrade the eavesdropping
channel using the jamming signal transmitted by the FD
relay, without impacting on the legitimate transmission of U1.
Furthermore, the self-interference at the FD relay is expected
to be eliminated for better performance. To achieve the above
goals, the following conditions should be satisfied.
hru1vj = 0; (5)
uyrHrrvj = 0: (6)
When (5) is met, the jamming signal will be zero-forced
at U1, which means that it only disrupts the eavesdropping
channel. In addition, the self-interference at the FD relay will
be cancelled with (6) satisfied. Before solving (5) and (6), the
feasibility conditions are first introduced as Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: The feasibility conditions for (5) and (6) can be
derived as
Nt +Nr  4; Nt  2; Nr  2: (7)
Proof: Note that (5) and (6) denote a homogeneous linear
equations, which can be solved only when the number of
equations is not larger than that of variables. The total number
of equations in (5) and (6) can be expressed as
N" = 2: (8)
Then, the total number of variables can be calculated as
N = Nt   1 +Nr   1 = Nt +Nr   2: (9)
From algebra, when (5) and (6) are solvable, we have
N"  N ) 2  Nt +Nr   2) Nt +Nr  4: (10)
Furthermore, for (5), the relationship between the number of
equations and variables can be denoted as
N (5)"  N (5) ) 1  Nt   1) Nt  2: (11)
Similarly, we can obtain Nr  2 to make (6) solvable.
Based on the idea of NOMA, SIC is performed at each
receiver to retrieve information in terms of the channel differ-
ence between them. Specifically, U1 has to decode the message
of U2 before recovering its own message. Hence, the received
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of U2 at U1 can
be written as follows with feasibility conditions in (7) satisfied,

[2]
1;u1
= jhsu1 j2 2Ps=

jhsu1 j2 1Ps + 21

: (12)
1When the estimation error of the CSI on Hrr cannot be ignored, or the
number of antennas at the relay is not enough to perform the beamforming,
more practical model for the residual self-interference channel has to be
considered, which will be investigated in our future work.
4Subtracting the signal of U2 perfectly, the received SINR for
U1 can be expressed as

[1]
1;u1
= jhsu1 j2 1Ps=21 : (13)
Then, the SINR for decoding the message of U2 at the relay
can be denoted as

[2]
1;r =
uyrhsr2 2Ps=uyrhsr2 1Ps + 2r : (14)
To further enhance the transmission reliability of U2 at the
relay, the decoding vector ur can be optimized according to
the following problem.
max
ur

[2]
1;r
s:t: uyrHrrvj = 0; kurk2 = 1:
(15)
According to the proof of Proposition 1 in [41], the optimal
solution to (15) can be calculated as
ur = Thsr=
q
hysrThsr; (16)
where T = INr   B
 
ByB
 1
By and B = Hrrvj .
We assume that the eavesdropper has strong multi-user
detection capability and consider the worst-case security2 [35].
Thus, the upper bound of intercepted SINR of U1 at E can
be expressed as

[1]
1;e = jhsej2 1Ps=

jhrevj j2 Prj + 2e

: (17)
Similarly, the SINR of U2 at E can be denoted as

[2]
1;e = jhsej2 2Ps=

jhrevj j2 Prj + 2e

: (18)
B. Second-Stage Transmission
In the second stage, the relay turns off its receiving antennas
and switches to the HD mode. Thus, only its decoded informa-
tion s2 is transmitted to U2, and U1 keeps silent. Meanwhile,
to further improve the security of U2, the BS transmits
the jamming signal to deteriorate the eavesdropping channel
simultaneously without affecting the legitimate transmission.
First, the received signal at U2 can be denoted as
y2;u2 =
p
Prhru2ws2 + nu2 ; (19)
where hru2 =
p
0d
 2
ru2 gru2 denotes the channel gains vector
between the relay and U2 with size 1Nt. Pr is the transmit
power of relay in the second stage. w 2 CNt1 denotes the
precoding vector at the relay, which is designed to enhance the
effective channel gain of U2 in terms of maximal ratio trans-
mission (MRT), i.e., w = hyru2= khru2k. nu2  CN (0; 22) is
the AWGN at U2. The received signal at the eavesdropper can
be expressed as
y2;e =
p
Prhrews2 +
p
Pjshsesjs + ne; (20)
where Pjs is the transmit power of jamming signal from
the BS to eavesdropper. Thus, the received SINR at U2 and
eavesdropper can be written as follows, respectively.

[2]
2;u2
= Pr jhru2wj2 =22 ; (21)
2The work in this paper is easy to be extended to the case where other
possible decoding strategies are adopted at the eavesdropper, details of which
are not included due to space limitation.

[2]
2;e = Pr jhrewj2 =

Pjs jhsej2 + 2e

: (22)
Based on (13) and (17), the secrecy capacity for U1 can be
defined as
Cs1 =
1
2
h
log2

1+
[1]
1;u1

 log2

1+
[1]
1;e
i+
; (23)
where [x]+ , max(x; 0). Moreover, according to the end-end
transmission, the secrecy capacity for U2 can be presented as
Cs2=
1
2
h
log2

1+min
n

[2]
1;u1
; 
[2]
1;r; 
[2]
2;u2
o
 log2

1+
[2]
1;e+
[2]
2;e
i+
:
(24)
III. SECRECY ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we analyze and derive the SOP for U1
and U2 in the proposed FDJam scheme, respectively, and the
corresponding asymptotic SOP analysis is given as well at
high transmit power. For simplicity, we assume that 21 =
22 = 
2
r = 
2
e = 
2, Ps = Pr = P and Pjr = Pjs = P ,
where  > 0 is a scaling factor.
A. SOP for U1
Similar to [33], considering the worst case of imperfect
SIC assumption, the secrecy outage probability for U1 can
be mathematically expressed as
Psop1 =Pr

Cs1<Rs1j[2]1;u12

Pr


[2]
1;u1
2

| {z }
A1
+Pr

Cs1<Rs1j[2]1;u1<2

Pr


[2]
1;u1
<2

| {z }
A2
;
(25)
where the items A1 and A2 denote the probabilities that the
secrecy capacity is smaller than the given threshold Rs1 under
the condition that whether the message s2 can be retrieved or
not. Particularly, when the signal of U2 fails to be decoded at
U1, i.e., 
[2]
1;u1
< 2, the secrecy capacity will be zero, which
means Pr

Cs1 < Rs1j[2]1;u1 < 2

= 1. Thus, the item A2
can be simplified as
Pr


[2]
1;u1
<2

=Pr

jhsu1 j2<
2
2
(2 12)P

=Pr(X<);(26)
where  = 2
2
(2 12)P should be larger than zero, i.e.,
2   12 > 0, otherwise, Psop1 = 1 will be always held.
In addition, X = jhsu1j2 follows an exponential distribution
with the parameter 0 = 1=(0d su1). Hence, its cumulative
density function (CDF) can be calculated as
FX(x) = 1  e 0x: (27)
Then, the item A2 can be rewritten as
FX() = Pr (X < ) = 1  e 0: (28)
Using (23) and (26), the term A1 can be transformed as
A1 = Pr

 < X < '


[1]
1;e

; (29)
5where '


[1]
1;e

=

22Rs1

1+
[1]
1;e

 1

2
1P
. Note that the prob-
ability in (29) exists only when the inequality '


[1]
1;e

> 
can be satisfied, namely, [1]1;e >  =
22
 2Rs1
2 12   1. Based on
the above analysis, we can rewrite (25) as
Psop1 = Pr

 < X < '


[1]
1;e

+ Pr (X < ) : (30)
To calculate the probability in (30), we first introduce
Lemma 2 as follows.
Lemma 2: Assume that random variables (RVs) Y1 and Y2
are both subjected to exponential distribution, i.e., Y1  E(1)
and Y2  E(2), where 1 and 2 are the parameters for
Y1 and Y2, respectively. Define the RV Z = Y1Y2+c , and its
probability density function (PDF) can be derived as
fZ(z) = e
 1zc

c
1z + 2
+
1
(1z + 2)2

: (31)
Proof: Due to the independence between Y1 and Y2, their
joint PDF can be expressed as
f(y1; y2) = f(y1)f(y2) = e
 (1y1+2y2); (32)
where =12. According to probability theory, the PDF of Z
can be denoted as fZ(z) =
R1
0
f(y1(y2; z); y2) j@zy1j dy2 =
e 1zc

c
1z+2
+ 1(1z+2)2

:
Define Z = [1]1;e, we can obtain its PDF as follows
according to Lemma 2.
fZ(z) = e
 1z2

2
1z + 2
+
1
(1z + 2)2

; (33)
where 1 = 1= (0d se 1P ) and 2 = 1= (0d
 
re P ).
Therefore, according to (28) and (33), the SOP for U1 can
be derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The SOP for U1 is derived as (34) at the top
of the next page with two cases  > 0 and   0 considered,
where  can be found in Appendix A. Ei(c) =
R c
 1 e
x=xdx
denotes the exponential integral function.
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. SOP for U2
When the secrecy capacity is smaller than its predefined
threshold, the transmission of confidential message for U2 will
be interrupted. Thus, the SOP for U2 can be denoted as
Psop2 = Pr (Cs2 < Rs2) ; (35)
where Rs2 is the given secrecy threshold of U2. Replacing
Cs2 with (24), the probability (35) can be rewritten as
Psop2=Pr
 
Q < 22Rs2V

=
Z 1
1
FQ
 
22Rs2v

fV (v)dv (36)
where Q = 1 + min
n

[2]
1;u1
; 
[2]
1;r; 
[2]
2;u2
o
and V = 1 + [2]1;e +

[2]
2;e. The CDF of Q and the PDF of V can be given by the
following Lemma 3:1 and 3:2, respectively.
Lemma 3.1: The CDF of Q can be obtained as
FQ(q) =
8<:
0 q < 1;
1 g1(q)g2(q)g3(q) 1 < q < 11 ;
1 q > 11 :
(37)
where g1(q), g2(q) and g3(q) can be found in Appendix B.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 3.2: The PDF of V can be derived as
fV (v) =

L
v   1
2
XL
l=1
q
1  x2l
fV1

v 1
2
xl+
v+1
2

fV2

v 

v 1
2
xl+
v+1
2

;
(38)
where xl = cos
 
2l 1
2L 

, and L denotes the number of nodes
set in the Chebyshev-Guass approximation. Besides, fV1(v)
and fV2(v) can be referred to Appendix C.
Proof: See Appendix C.
In terms of Lemma 3.1 and 3.2, the SOP for U2 can be
rewritten as
Psop2 =
Z b
1
FQ
 
v22Rs2

fV (v)dv +
Z 1
b
fV (v)dv; (39)
where b = 2 2Rs2=1. Note that Psop2 = 1 when b < 1.
To solve (39), we utilize the Chebyshev-Guass quadrature to
get an approximation for it. Specifically, based on (37), the
formula (39) can be simplified as
Psop2=1 
Z b
1
g1
 
v22Rs2

g2
 
v22Rs2

g3
 
v22Rs2

fV (v)dv: (40)
Then, using the Chebyshev-Guass quadrature, the SOP for U2
can be derived as
Psop2=1 
L
b 1
2
LX
j=1
q
1 x2jg1($) g2($);g3($)fV
 $
22Rs2

;(41)
where $ = 22Rs2(b 12 xj+
b+1
2 ) and xj = cos
 
2j 1
2L 

.
C. Asymptotic SOP Analysis
To gain more insights about the proposed FDJam scheme,
we analyze the asymptotic SOP for U1 and U2 with high
transmit power considered, i.e., P !1.
First, from (34), we can obtain
P1sop1 = 0; (42)
for both the cases of  > 0 and   0, when P ! 1. This
means that U1 can always achieve secure transmission with
the secrecy rate Rs1 at high transmit power.
On the other hand, for U2 with sufficiently high transmit
power, its asymptotic SOP can be given by the following
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: The asymptotic SOP for U2 can be derived
as
P1sop2 = 1 

L
b 1
2
XL
j=1
q
1 x2jfV

b  1
2
(xj + 1)

;(43)
where fV (v) can be seen in the proof.
Proof: When P !1, (35) can be approximated as
P1sop2 =Pr

1 + 21
1 + V1 + V2
< 22Rs2

=1 Pr

V1+V2 <
2 2Rs2
1
 1

=1 FV (b 1);
(44)
6Psop1 =
8>>><>>>:
1  2 exp

 1

dsu1
dse

2
 
22Rs1   1 12 + dsu1dse  22Rs12 exp (2)Ei( 2) ;   0;
(1  FX())2 exp( 1
2)
1+2
+ FX()  2 exp

 1

dsu1
dse

2
 
22Rs1   1
dsu1
dse

22Rs12 exp(2)Ei( (1 + 2)) + exp( 1)1+2

;  > 0:
(34)
where V = V1 + V2, V1 = 2jhsej2=(jhrevj j2), V2 =
jhrewj2=(jhsej2). FV denotes the CDF of V .
According to Lemma 3.2, we can obtain
fV (v)=
Z v
0
fV1(v   v2)fV2(v2)dv2 = pp0
Z v
0
H (v2) dv2 (45)
where the parameters p, p0, p1, p2, p3 and p4 are the same as
those in Lemma 3.2. H(v2) denotes
H(v2) = 1
((p1v2 (p1v+p2))2(p3v2+p4))2
:
To our best knowledge, it is difficult to obtain the closed-form
solution to the integral in (45). Thus, the Chebyshev-Guass
approximation is utilized to solve it as
fV (v) = pp0

L
v
2
XL
l=1
q
1  x2lH
v
2
(xl + 1)

: (46)
Furthermore, we can obtain
FV (b 1)= 
L
b 1
2
XL
j=1
q
1 x2jfV

b  1
2
(xj + 1)

;(47)
Substituting (47) into (44), the asymptotic SOP for U2 can be
expressed as P1sop2=1 L b 12
LP
j=1
q
1 x2jfV
 
b 1
2 (xj+1)

:
From (43), we can observe that when P !1, the SOP of
U2 is varying with the change of parameters , 1, dre and
dse, and will not be impacted by dsr and dru2. This indicates
that the power allocation between the legitimate signal and
the jamming signal and the power allocation between U1 and
U2 are both important for the secrecy performance of U2, and
the relative locations between the nodes BS, R and E are
vital as well. In addition, the increasing number of antennas
at the relay will not change the SOP of U2 with P ! 1.
This is because when the transmit power is high, the statistical
distribution of the transmission and eavesdropping rate in (44)
are independent of the number of antennas.
IV. TWO BENCHMARK SCHEMES
In this section, other two schemes, HDJam and FDNoJam,
are proposed to compare the performance of the proposed
FDJam scheme as benchmarks, with their SOP also derived.
A. HDJam Scheme
1) System Model: In the scheme, we consider N = Nt +
Nr antennas equipped at the relay are utilized to transmit or
recover information. In the first stage of BS ! fU1; R;Eg,
the relay cannot send the jamming signal to the eavesdropper
due to the half-duplex mode. For fairness, we assume that
the BS can send messages with transmit power PT , where
PT = Ps + Pjr. Thus, the signal transmitted by the BS can
be modified as
s =
p
1PT s1 +
p
2PT s2; (48)
Accordingly, the received signal at the relay and U1 can be
denoted as follows, respectively.
y1;r = uyrhsrs+ u
y
rnr: (49)
y1;u1 = hsu1s+ nu1 ; (50)
In terms of the principle of maximum ratio combining (MRC),
ur is designed as ur = hsr=khsrk. Then, the received SINR
at the relay for U2 can be expressed as

[2]
1;r = khsrk2 2PT =

khsrk2 1PT + 2r

: (51)
In addition, replacing Ps with PT in (12) and (13), the received
SINR for U2 and U1 at U1 can be derived similarly as

[2]
1;u1
= jhsu1 j2 2PT =

jhsu1 j2 1PT + 21

; (52)

[1]
1;u1
= jhsu1 j2 1PT =21 : (53)
The intercepted signal at eavesdropper can be denoted as
y1;e = hses+ ne; (54)
and we have

[1]
1;e = jhsej2 1PT =2e ; (55)

[2]
1;e = jhsej2 2PT =2e : (56)
On the other hand, the transmission of the second stage is
the same as that in the FDJam scheme, i.e., the BS transmits
the jamming signal, while the relay forwards its decoded
message to U2. Thus, in this scheme, the expressions of
secrecy capacity for U1 and U2 are same as (23) and (24).
2) SOP Analysis: Following the same method adopted in
the FDJam scheme, the SOP for U1 can be derived as (57)
at the top of the next page, where 0 = dsu1=0 and  =
2=(1PT0d
 
se ).
As for U2, its SOP can be derived as
Psop2=1 
L
b 1
2
LX
j=1
q
1 x2jg1($) g2($);g3($)fV
 $
22Rs2

:(58)
g1(q), g2(q) and fV (v) in (58) are different from those in
(41). Specifically, in this scheme, Q1 and Q2 subject to
Gamma distribution with the shape parameter N and the scale
7Psop1=
8<:1 
1PT
022Rs12+1PT
exp

 0(22Rs1 1)21PT

;   0;
1 exp( 0) (1 exp ())  1PT022Rs12+1PT exp

 

1PT
022Rs12+1PT


+ 0(2
2Rs1 1)2
1PT

;  >0:
(57)
fV (v) = pp1e
 p1(v 1)

p1
p23
e (Ei( (v + ))  Ei( )) + 1
p23
  e
 v
p23(v + )

: (60)
parameters 1 and 2, respectively, i.e., Q1   (N; 1) and
Q2   (N; 2). Thus, g1(q) and g2(q) should be modified as
g1(q) = e
  (q)PT 1
N 1X
i=0
1
i!

(q)
PT 1
i
;
g2(q) = e
  q 12
N 1X
i=0
1
i!

q   1
2
i
;
(59)
Moreover, in terms of Lemma 2 and 3.1, the PDF of V can
be calculated as (60) at the top of next page, where  = p32 
p1 and  = p4=p3. p1 = 2=(2PT0d se ), and parameters p,
p3 and p4 are same as those in Appendix C.
3) Asymptotic SOP Analysis: When PT ! 1, the asymp-
totic SOP of U1 can be denoted as
P1sop1 = 1 
1
1 + 22Rs1d se dsu1
: (61)
From (61), we can see that P1sop1 is proportional to dsu1 and
inversely proportional to dse, which is consistent with the
practical analysis. In addition, the asymptotic SOP of U2 can
be expressed as
P1sop2=1 Pr


[2]
1;e+jhrewj2=jhsej2<2 2Rs2=1 1

:(62)
From (56), we can know that [2]1;e ! 1 with PT ! 1, and
thus, P1sop2 = 1.
B. FDNoJam
1) System Model: In the scheme, we consider that the relay
works at FD mode and no jamming signal is generated to
degrade the eavesdropping channel, i.e., the relay receives
information from the BS, and simultaneously transmits the
already decoded signal to U2. For fairness, we assume that
both the transmit power of BS and relay is set as PT . Thus,
at the time slot t, the transmitted signal at the BS and relay
can be expressed as
s(t) =
p
1PT s1(t) +
p
2PT s2(t); (63)
sr(t) =
p
PTws2(t  ): (64)
Then, the received signal at U1 and relay can be denoted as
yu1(t) = hsu1s(t) +
p
PThru1ws2(t  ) + nu1(t); (65)
yr(t) = uyrhsrs(t) +
p
PTuyrHrrws2(t  ) + uyrnr; (66)
where   1 represents the processing delay at the relay.
According to [42], we can observe that the second item in
(65) can be removed via interference cancellation due to the
fact that the side information of s2(t   ) can be obtained
with SIC performed at U1. Thus, the received SINR of U1
and U2 at U1, i.e., 
[2]
u1 and 
[1]
u1 , can be derived the same as
(52) and (53), respectively. For (66), the same beamforming
design as that in the FDJam scheme can be utilized to cancel
the self-interference at the relay. Hence, [2]r can be expressed
the same as [2]1;r in (14), replacing Ps with PT .
Furthermore, the received signal at U2 can be given as
yu2(t) =
p
PThru2ws2(t  ) + nu2(t): (67)
Accordingly, its received SINR can be written as
u2 = PT jhru2wj2 =22 : (68)
For the eavesdropper, its overheard signal can be denoted as
ye(t) = hses(t) +
p
PThrews2(t  ) + ne(t): (69)
Similar to the other two schemes, we consider the lower bound
of secrecy capacity, and thus the intercepted SINR of U1 at
the eavesdropper can be denoted as
[1]e = 1PT jhsej2 =2e ; (70)
and the received SINR of U2 at the eavesdropper can be
expressed as [28]
[2]e = 2PT jhsej2 =2e + PT jhrewj2 =2e : (71)
Due to the FD mode, the transmission of the cooperative
NOMA system can be established during the entire time slot,
which means there is no 12 factor included in the definitions
of users’ secrecy capacity. Thus, in this scheme, the secrecy
capacity of U1 and U2 can be denoted as
Cs1 =
h
log2 (1 + u1)  log2

1 + [1]e
i+
; (72)
Cs2=
h
log2

1+min
n

[2]
u1 ; 
[2]
r ; 
[2]
u2
o
 log2

1+[2]e
i+
:(73)
2) SOP Analysis: In terms of (25), we can calculate the SOP
of U1 with same method in Section III as follows.
Psop1 =

1  a1 e a2 ;   0;
1 e 0(1 e)  a1 e (a2+a1);  > 0;
(74)
where a1 = 02
Rs12
1PT
+  and a2 =
0(2
Rs1 1)2
1PT
.  and 0
are same as those in (57).
Similarly, the SOP of U2 can be derived as
Psop2 = Pr
 
Q < 2Rs2V

=
Z 1
1
FQ
 
2Rs2v

fV (v)dv: (75)
Note that the CDF of Q can be derived the same as (37), yet
the PDF of V needs to be re-calculated according to Lemma
3.2 as
fV (v) =
p
p4   p3

e p3(v 1)   e p4(v 1)

; (76)
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Fig. 2. Comparison of secrecy outage probability of U1 for three schemes
with different PT .
where p3 = 2=(2PT0d se ), p4 = 
2=(PT0d
 
re ), and
p = p3p4. Substituting (76) and (37) into (75), we can get the
SOP of U2 as
Psop2=1 
L
c 1
2
LX
j=1
q
1 x2jg1(!) g2(!);g3(!)fV
 !
2Rs2

; (77)
where ! = 2Rs2
 
c 1
2 xj +
c+1
2

and c = 2 Rs2=1.
3) Asymptotic SOP Analysis: Similar to the HDJam scheme,
the asymptotic SOP of U1 can be denoted as
P1sop1 = 1 
1
1 + 2Rs1d se dsu1
: (78)
We can express the SOP of U2 as follows when PT !1.
P1sop2 = 1  Pr

[2]e < 2
 Rs2=1   1

: (79)
In this case, it is obvious that [2]e !1, and thus P1sop2 = 1.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, simulation results are presented to validate
the effectiveness of the proposed FDJam scheme. We assume
that all the channels suffer from Rayleigh block fading, and
that the path-loss exponent  = 3. The SINR threshold for
decoding the message of U2 at U1 is set as 2 = 0:5. The
target secrecy rate over unit bandwidth for U1 and U2 is set
as Rs1 = 1 bit/s/Hz and Rs2 = 0:5 bit/s/Hz, respectively. The
distances are set as dsu1 = 10; dsr = dse = dru1 = dre = 20
and dru2 = 80 in meters. We also set 1 = 0:2; 0 =  40 dB
and 2 =  110 dBm.
First, we compare the SOP of both U1 and U2 for the three
schemes with different PT in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively.
We set L = 100 in the Chebyshev-Guass approximation and
 = 99. From the results, we can see that results obtained
by Monte Carlo simulations match well with the analytical
results for these three schemes. In Fig. 2, the SOP of U1
decreases with PT for the three schemes. Specifically, at lower
PT , the SOP of U1 in the FDNoJam scheme is lower than both
the HDJam and FDJam schemes. This is because the HDJam
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with different PT .
scheme has 1=2 factor in its definition of secrecy capacity,
and part of the transmit power PT in the FDJam scheme is
exploited to generate jamming signal. Nevertheless, the SOP
of U1 in the FDJam scheme is the lowest and close to 0
when PT increases, while the SOP of U1 in the other two
schemes tends to be a constant. This is due to the fact that
the jamming signal transmitted by the FD relay can degrade
the eavesdropping channel significantly without affecting the
legitimate channels, which is consistent with the asymptotic
SOP analysis in Section III-C. In addition, the asymptotic SOP
of U1 in the FDJam scheme cannot be found in Fig. 2, due
to the fact that it is 0 according to (42). From Fig. 3, we can
observe that the SOP of U2 in both FDNoJam and HDJam
schemes is always approximated to 1 within the entire range
of PT , due to the worst-case assumption of the strong detection
capability and MRC technique considered at the eavesdropper,
which is also consistent with the asymptotic SOP analysis in
Section IV. For the FDJam scheme, the SOP of U2 becomes
smaller with PT and tends to be a constant when PT is high,
which is perfectly matched with the asymptotic result in (43).
Then, we evaluate the SOP of U1 and U2 for the FDJam
and HDJam schemes under different Ps, when  = 1,  = 10,
 = 100, as shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. From the results,
we can see that both users’ SOP in the FDJam scheme
decreases with  and Ps, especially for the cell-edge user U2,
which indicates that increasing the transmit power of jamming
signal can effectively disrupt the eavesdropping and guarantee
the secure transmission of NOMA users. For the HDJam
scheme, the SOP of U1 becomes smaller and approximates
to a constant when  increases in Fig. 4, due to the increasing
transmit power PT , which is the same as the results in Fig. 2.
Nevertheless, the SOP of U2 in the HDJam scheme is nearly
unchanged with , and tends to be 1, which means that the
jamming signal generated in the second stage has nearly no
impact on the SOP of U2. This is because there is no jamming
signal to disturb the eavesdropping in the first stage and MRC
is adopted at the eavesdropper.
In Fig. 6, the influence of the number of antennas at the
9−40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
P
s
 (dBm)
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f U
1
 
 
FDJam,η=1
FDJam,η=10
FDJam,η=100
HDJam,η=1
HDJam,η=10
HDJam,η=100
Fig. 4. Comparison of secrecy outage probability of U1 for the FDJam and
HDJam schemes under different Ps, with three cases of  = 1,  = 10 and
 = 100 considered.
−40 −30 −20 −10 0 10 20
10−2
10−1
100
P
s
 (dBm)
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f U
2
 
 
FDJam,η=1
FDJam,η=10
FDJam,η=100
HDJam,η=1
HDJam,η=10
HDJam,η=100
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relay on the SOP of U2 is compared for the three schemes.
Three cases of Nt = Nr = 2, Nt = Nr = 3 and Nt = Nr = 4
are considered.  = 99. Similarly to the results in Fig. 3, the
SOP of U2 for the FDNoJam and HDJam schemes in Fig. 6
is almost unchanged with the number of antennas. However,
the secrecy performance of U2 in the FDJam scheme can be
improved with larger number of antennas. Furthermore, it is
worth noticing that the number of antennas at the relay has
no impact on the SOP of U2 when the transmit power is high
enough, which is consistent with the asymptotic analysis in
Section III-C. Thus, when the transmit power is adequate, we
can equip only minimum required antennas at the relay to
achieve reliable performance, i.e., Nt = Nr = 2.
In Fig. 7, the secrecy performance of U1 and U2 in the
proposed FDJam scheme are compared with different power
allocation between confidential and jamming signals. Three
cases of PT =  10dBm, PT = 0dBm and PT = 10dBm
are considered. From the results, we can observe that the
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considered.
SOP of U1 decreases first, and then increases as 1+ varys.
This reveals that there exists a power tradeoff between the
confidential and jamming signals for U1, i.e., a tradeoff should
be made between the transmission reliability and security
when PT is limited, and  should be carefully chosen to
achieve better security for U1. On the other hand, we can see
that there is also a tradeoff for the secrecy performance of U2
with . Thus, more transmit power should be allocated for the
jamming signal to achieve optimal performance of security,
with increasing PT .
Then, the impact of the locations of U1 and eavesdropper
on the SOP of U1 is studied for the three schemes in Fig. 8.
 = 99. From the results, we can find that the SOP of U1
becomes better with smaller dsu1 and larger dse. Moreover,
when dse < dsu1, the SOP of U1 in both HDJam and
FDNoJam schemes increases severely, while in the proposed
FDJam scheme, the performance deteriorates only a little
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Fig. 8. Comparison of secrecy outage probability of U1 for the three schemes
under varying PT , with different locations of U1 and eavesdropper.
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PT .
due to the generated jamming signal at the FD relay. Thus,
compared with the other two schemes, the FDJam scheme has
a better performance to disrupt the closer eavesdropping. We
can also see that the SOP of U1 in the FDJam scheme is always
approximated to zero at high transmit power, with different
locations of U1 and eavesdropper. However, for the other two
schemes, their asymptotic SOP will be reduced to a positive
constant at high transmit power, which will also decrease as
dsu1 decreases and dse increases. All these results are perfectly
consistent with the asymptotic analysis in Sections III and IV.
In Fig. 9, the SOP of U2 in the FDJam scheme is compared
for different locations of the U2, BS and eavesdropper, under
varying PT . Two cases of dru2 = 20m and dru2 = 60m are
considered.  = 99. Four groups of (dse; dre) are involved,
i.e., (20,20), (40,40), (40,25) and (25,40). From the results,
we can see that as PT increases, the SOP of U2 is declined,
which is consistent with the results in Fig. 3 and Fig. 6.
Also, when the transmit power is relatively high, the SOP
of U2 tends to be the same constant with different dru2,
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OMA-FDJam and NOMA-FDJam scheme with varying PT .
while the distances dse and dre can actually affect the secrecy
performance. These results are in accord with the asymptotic
analysis in Section III. Interestingly, when the BS and the
relay are both away from or close to the eavesdropper, the
SOP performance is almost the same, as shown in Fig. 9,
due to the fact that the strength of jamming and confidential
signal will become smaller or larger simultaneously, under the
conditions of (20; 20) and (40; 40), respectively.
Finally, we also design a FDJam scheme based on orthog-
onal multiple access (OMA), i.e., the OMA-FDJam scheme,
as a benchmark, and compare its secrecy performance with
the proposed NOMA-FDJam scheme. For the OMA-FDJam
scheme, the transmission process during each time slot is
divided into three stages in average. In the first and second
stage, the BS transmits the message s1 and s2 to U1 and
the relay, respectively, and the relay sends jamming signal
to disturb the eavesdropping. In the third stage, the relay
forwards the message s2 to U2 and the BS transmits the
jamming signal to protect its security. From the results in Fig.
10, we can observe that the SOP of U1 in the OMA-FDJam
scheme is lower than that in the NOMA-FDJam scheme due
to the fact that less wireless resource can be allocated for the
transmission of U1 in the former scheme. As for U2, its secrecy
performance in the NOMA-FDJam scheme is superior to that
in the OMA-FDJam scheme when the transmit power is low,
whereas becomes worse when the transmit power is high. This
is because more wireless resource can be available at U2 in
the NOMA-FDJam scheme, while the error floor will occur
with P !1 due to the inter-user interference existing in the
transmission rate of U2, which can be demonstrated in (44). In
addition, it is worth noting that three transmission stages are
involved to perform the security transmission for both NOMA
users in the OMA-FDJam scheme, which will make the system
design more intractable. Furthermore, we assume fixed power
allocation, i.e., , 1 and 2 are unchanged according to PT ,
due to the fact that the power allocation is out of the scope of
this paper. Nevertheless, if we can change the values of , 1
and 2 according to the varying of PT , the error floor of U2
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in our proposed scheme can be further reduced significantly.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered the downlink NOMA
system assisted by a multi-antenna FD relay and investigated
its secrecy performance with the presentence of an eaves-
dropper. To guarantee the secure transmission, a two-stage
jamming scheme, the FDJam scheme, was proposed, and
the beamforming of relay was designed to cancel the self-
interference and the jamming signal at the relay and legitimate
node, respectively. The close-form expressions of SOP were
derived for the NOMA users to evaluate the secrecy capability
of the proposed scheme, and the asymptotic SOP analysis
was provided as well. In addition, two benchmark schemes
of HDJam and FDNoJam were also designed and analyzed to
validate the effectiveness of the FDJam scheme. Simulation
results were presented to show that the analytical results of
SOP were perfectly consistent with the Monte Carlo results,
and the proposed FDJam scheme can significantly improve the
secrecy performance via multi-antenna FD relay and jamming.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The SOP for U1 in (30) can be equivalent to
Psop1 =
Z 1

FX('(z))fZ(z)dz| {z }
I1
 
Z 1

FX()fZ(z)dz| {z }
I2
+FX();
(80)
which is discussed in the following two cases.
Case 1: When   0, the probability of Pr ( < X < '(z))
does not exist with  < z < 0, which means z 2 (0;1).
Thus, the part I2 in (80) can be rewritten as
I2 =
Z 1
0
FX()fZ(z)dz = FX()
Z 1
0
fZ(z)dz
=FX()
Z 1
0
e 1z
2

2
1z+2
+
1
(1z+2)2

dz
=FX()I21:
(81)
According to the results in [43], I21 can be calculated as
I21=2
2

 e22Ei   22+e22Ei   22+ 1
22

: (82)
Apparently, I21 = 1, and we can obtain I2 = FX().
Subsequently, I1 can be expressed as
I1 =
Z 1
0
FX('(z))fZ(z)dz = I21 + I11; (83)
where I11 should be organized as
I11=  exp
  1 (dsu1=dse) 2  22Rs1   1Z 1
0
exp( 1z)

2
1z + 2
+
1
(1z + 2)2

dz;
(84)
where  = 2

dsu1
dse

22Rs1 + 1

. Similarly, with the
results in [43] adopted, we can calculate the integral I11 as
I11 =  2 exp
  1 (dsu1=dse) 2  22Rs1   1 
1=2+(dsu1=dse)

22Rs12 exp(2)Ei( 2)

:
(85)
With all above, the SOP for U1 can be obtained as
Psop1 = I1   I2 + FX() = 1 + I11: (86)
Case 2: When  > 0, the integral I21 can be changed as
I21 = 2 exp
  12 = (1 + 2) ; (87)
Furthermore, the result of I11 should be replaced with
I11 =  2 exp
  1 (dsu1=dse) 2  22Rs1   1 
(dsu1=dse)

22Rs12 exp(2)Ei( (1+2))+

;
(88)
where  = exp( 1)=(1 + 2). Thus, with  > 0, we
can calculate the SOP for U1 as
Psop1 = (1  FX()) I21 + I11 + FX(): (89)
Combining (86) and (89), (34) can be achieved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1
Define RVs Q1 = 1 + 
[2]
1;r, Q2 = 1 + 
[2]
2;u2
and Q3 =
1 + 
[2]
1;u1
. The CDF for the RV Q can be calculated as
FQ(q) =Pr (min fQ1; Q2; Q3g)
=1  (1 FQ1(q))(1 FQ2(q))(1 FQ3(q));
(90)
where FQ1(q), FQ2(q) and FQ3(q) denote the CDF of Q1,
Q2 and Q3, respectively. For Q1, due to the fact that
uyrhsr2
follows the Gamma distribution with (Nr   1; 0d sr ), where
(Nr 1) and 1 = 0d sr are the shape and scale parameters,
respectively, the CDF for Q1 can be obtained as
FQ1(q) = 1  e 
(q)
P1
Nr 2X
i=0
1
i!

(q)
P1
i
= 1  g1(q); (91)
where (q) = (q 1)
2
2 (q 1)1 . When (q) > 0, i.e., 1 < q <
1=1, (91) is held. Thus,
FQ1(q) =
8<:
0 q < 1;
1 g1(q) 1 < q < 11 ;
1 q > 11 ;
(92)
For Q2, it can be known that jhru2wj2 subjects to a Gamma
distribution with (Nt; 2), where 2 =
P0d
 
ru2
2 . Hence, the
CDF of Q2 can be expressed as
FQ2(q) = 1  e 
q 1
2
Nt 1X
i=0
1
i!

q   1
2
i
= 1  g2(q): (93)
Note that (93) is satisfied with q > 1, otherwise, FQ2(q) = 0.
Besides, based on (27), the CDF of Q3 can be denoted as
FQ3(q) = 1  e 0
(q)
P = 1  g3(q); (94)
where (q) is the same as that in (91). Substituting (92), (93)
and (94) into (90), we can obtain
FQ(q) =
8<:
0 q < 1;
1 g1(q)g2(q)g3(q) 1 < q < 11 ;
1 q > 11 :
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.2
Assume that V1 = 1 + 
[2]
1;e and V2 = 
[2]
2;e. According to
Lemma 2, the PDF of V1 can be denoted as
fV1(v1)=p0e
 p1(v1 1)2

2
p1(v1 1)+ p2+
1
(p1(v1 1)+p2)2

; (95)
where p1 = 1=(0d se 2P ), p2 = 1=(0d
 
re P ) and p0 =
p1p2. Similarly, the PDF of V2 can be derived as
fV2(v2)=pe
 p3v22

2
p3v2+ p4
+
1
(p3v2 + p4)2

; (96)
where p3 = 1=(0d re P ), p4 = 1=(0d
 
se P ) and p = p3p4.
Combining (95) and (96), we can obtain the PDF of V as
fV (v) =
Z v
1
fV1(v1)fV2(v   v1)dv1: (97)
The accurate solution for (97) is difficult to calculate.
Thus, the Chebyshev-Guass quadrature is performed to
find its approximation, and (97) can be derived as fV (v) =

L
v 1
2
LP
l=1
p
1  x2l fV1
 
v 1
2 xl+
v+1
2

fV2
 
v     v 12 xl + v+12 ,
where xl = cos
 
2l 1
2L 

, and L denotes the number of nodes
set in the Chebyshev-Guass approximation.
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